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Some Alternatives? Event-Related
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Pragmatic Interpretations of Some
Presented in Isolation
Cécile Barbet * and Guillaume Thierry
School of Psychology, Bangor University, Bangor, UK
In sentence verification tasks involving under-informative statements such as Some
elephants are mammals, some adults appear more tolerant to pragmatic violations
than others. The underlying causes of such inter-individual variability remain however
essentially unknown. Here, we investigated inter-individual variation in adults deriving the
scalar inference “not all” triggered by the quantifier some. We first assessed the individual
intolerance to pragmatic violations in adult participants presented with under-informative
some-statements (e.g., Some infants are young). We then recorded event-related brain
potentials in the same participants using an oddball paradigm where an ambiguous
deviant word some presented in isolation had to be taken either as a match (in its literal
interpretation “at least some”) or as a mismatch (in its pragmatic interpretation “some
but not all”) and where an unambiguous deviant target word all was featured as control.
Mean amplitude modulation of the classic P3b provided a measure of the ease with
which participants considered some and all as deviants within each experimental block.
We found that intolerance to pragmatic violations was associated with a reduction in the
magnitude of the P3b effect elicited by the target some when it was to be considered
a literal match. Furthermore, we failed to replicate a straightforward literal interpretation
facilitation effect in our experiment which offers a control for task demands. We propose
that the derivation of scalar inferences also relies on general, but flexible, mismatch
resolution processes.
Keywords: scalar inferences, inter-individual variation, pragmatic tolerance, systemizing, event-related potentials,
P3b
1. INTRODUCTION
Understanding the meaning of sentences involves two kinds of processes: (i) decoding literal
meaning and (ii) deriving inferences that go beyond the literal meaning of words and clauses
(implicatures, see e.g., Grice, 1968). For example, in:
(1) Anna: Did the children’s summer camp go well?
Bob: Some of them got stomach flu.
a. More than one child/at least some of the children got stomach flu.
b. Not all the children got stomach flu.
c. The summer camp didn’t go as well as hoped (from Carston, 2004).
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while the literal meaning of Bob’s answer is (1-a), Anna can
infer from his answer both (1-b) and (1-c). According to
Gricean terminology (see e.g., Grice, 1968; Levinson, 2000),
(1-b.) is a generalized conversational implicature because it
is triggered by a specific item (some) and is assumed to
arise generally across contexts; while (1-c) is a particularized
conversational implicature because it crucially depends on
the context. Indeed if Anna’s question had been “Were all
children able to sit their exams?” for example, the inference
(1-c) would not arise; whereas if Anna’s question concerned
the exams rather than the summer camp (1-b) would still
hold.
Generalized inferences such as (1-b) are called scalar
inferences (hereafter SIs) because they are triggered by linguistic
expressions which have stronger competitors on scales of
informativeness (see Horn, 1972, 1989). For instance, in (1), some
contrasts with all and thus can trigger the SI “not all.” Other
examples of lexical scales are 〈always, sometimes〉, 〈and, or〉,
〈finish, start〉, 〈impossible, difficult〉 (see e.g., van Tiel et al., 2016).
In Gricean pragmatics, drawing an SI requires at least two
steps (see e.g., Katsos and Bishop, 2011; Bott et al., 2012; Breheny
et al., 2013). First, the hearer determines whether the speaker
could have made a more informative (i.e., stronger) statement;
then she negates the alternative statement because she assumes
that the speaker would have chosen the stronger statement if
it had been true. In certain semantic contexts, e.g., antecedents
of conditionals (see “downward entailing” contexts in Chierchia,
2004), such as:
(2) If some of the students fail the test, their teacher will be
disappointed (Katsos et al., 2005, p. 1108) .
it is not expected that the SI will be drawn since an alternative
sentence with a stronger term would be informatively weaker
(see e.g., Hartshorne et al., 2015; Politzer-Ahles and Gwilliams,
2015). Moreover, depending on context, the hearer may or may
not negate the alternative statement when it is stronger according
to assumed speaker knowledge in a second step, also called the
epistemic step (see e.g., Breheny et al., 2013). Therefore, we can
expect a hearer of:
(3) At my client’s request, I skimmed the investment report.
Some of the real estate investments lost money (Bergen
and Grodner, 2012).
to stick to the literal meaning of some because the speaker
is assumed to have insufficient knowledge of the situation to
warrant the use of the stronger alternative all. On the contrary,
a hearer of:
(4) At my client’s request, I meticulously compiled the
investment report. Some of the real estate investments lost
money (Bergen and Grodner, 2012).
should draw the SI, since the speaker can be inferred to have
exhaustive information about the case.
Scalar inferences have become the test case in experimental
pragmatics for more than a decade in the debate opposing
tenets of possible automatic inference derivation (the “default
models,” inspired by Levinson, 2000; Chierchia, 2004) and tenets
of context-dependency, arguing that generalized implicatures do
not exist (the “context-drivenmodels,” inspired by Carston, 1995;
Sperber andWilson, 1995). SI context-sensitivity has been shown
in a number of experimental studies (see e.g., Breheny et al., 2006;
Bergen and Grodner, 2012; Politzer-Ahles and Fiorentino, 2013;
Hartshorne et al., 2015), but expected delays or processing costs
associated with their derivation have not always been observed
(see e.g., Grodner et al., 2010; Breheny et al., 2013; Politzer-Ahles
and Fiorentino, 2013; Degen and Tanenhaus, 2015; Hartshorne
et al., 2015). Consequently, a constraint-based formulation of
context-driven models has been proposed according to which SI
derivation can appear default-like when enough linguistic and
contextual cues are present and reduce processing delay or cost
(see Grodner et al., 2010; Degen and Tanenhaus, 2011, 2015).
However, models in experimental pragmatics have paid less
attention to inter-individual variation (but see Feeney et al., 2004;
Nieuwland et al., 2010; Antoniou and Katsos, 2011; Heyman
and Schaeken, 2015; Zhao et al., 2015). In sentence verification
paradigms involving under-informative sentences such as:
(5) Some elephants are mammals (Bott and Noveck, 2004).
some adult participants tend to consistently accept such under-
informative statements that are literally true but pragmatically
infelicitous (not just some, but all elephants are mammals) while
other tend to consistently reject them (see e.g., Noveck and
Posada, 2003; Feeney et al., 2004; Antoniou and Katsos, 2011;
Hunt et al., 2013). This led to a distinction between “literal”
(or “logical”) and “pragmatic” responders. Moreover, because
rejecting under-informative statements took more time than
accepting them, it was assumed that literal responses did not
require computation of the SI. However, in Feeney et al. (2004)
or Antoniou and Katsos (2011) , participants needed more time
to accept under-informative some-statements than informative
some-statements such as:
(6) Some men have beards (Feeney et al., 2004).
Such a result is not expected if one assumes that the SI is
not computed at all in the case of literal responses to under-
informative statements. Therefore, Antoniou and Katsos (2011)
proposed that all adult participants are sensitive to violations of
informativeness and thus, that all consider whether or not a more
informative statement with a stronger expression could have been
used. Katsos and Bishop (2011, p. 77) stressed that responses to
under-informative statements in forced-choice paradigms may
also reflect a metalinguistic decision to “reject the utterance as
worse than optimal or to accept it as better than false.” That
being said, a consistently literal vs. pragmatic response pattern
could also reflect a desire of within-task consistency on the part
of participants. Indeed, since the test sentences can be interpreted
as either true or false and the choice is forced, participants may
initially randomly opt for true or false and then stick to their
initial choice in order to maintain idiosyncratic consistency (see
also Tavano and Kaiser, 2010).
Since they are able to fully derive SIs, one wonders why some
adult participants accept under-informative statements at all. If a
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literal or pragmatic response pattern1 is not essentially accounted
for by different strategic and/or metalinguistic processes, one
hypothesis is that participants who are led to interpret some
literally or pragmatically might experience some difficulty
shifting from one to the other interpretation. Here we sought
to obtain an independent, quantitative, and objective measure
of pragmatic or literal functioning in participants construed
as pragmatic or literal on the basis of their performance in a
sentence evaluation task, using event-related potentials (ERPs).
Previous ERP studies using under-informative segments have
provided some evidence that pragmatically skilled participants
(as indexed by sub-scale(s) of the Autism-Spectrum Quotient
questionnaire) are more sensitive to violations of informativeness
than their less pragmatically skilled peers (Nieuwland et al., 2010,
N400 study; Zhao et al., 2015, MMN study). To our knowledge,
no study to date has investigated inter-individual variation in
participants led to behave pragmatically or literally. In the present
study, we invited participants to consider some in its literal or
pragmatic sense via direct instruction (see also Bott and Noveck,
2004; Bott et al., 2012; Tomlinson et al., 2013) rather than
constrain the interpretation of some based on cues derived from
the linguistic context. This is because conditions are never fully
comparable even when considering elegantly designed studies in
which context control was maximal. For instance, in Politzer-
Ahles and Fiorentino (2013) and Politzer-Ahles and Gwilliams
(2015) , any vs. all were used in the contexts preceding some.
However, any and some are more strongly associated than all and
some (see e.g., the Edinburgh Associative Thesaurus Kiss et al.,
1973) leading to the any-contexts possibly being more predictive
of some than the all-contexts. Moreover, in order to focus the
quantitative ERP measure on the critical word some, we resorted
to present it in isolation. Furthermore, we used a pragmatically
unambiguous stimulus all as control whereas the ambiguous
stimulus somewas to be considered in its literal (at-least-some) or
its pragmatic (some-but-not-all) sense depending on instruction
given at the onset of each experimental block.
The P300 wave (or P3, see e.g., Luck, 2005; Polich, 2007) which
is a positive-going ERP deflection peaking between 250 and
500 ms (or even later depending on experimental parameters,
see e.g., Picton, 1992; Polich, 2007) is commonly elicited by
deviant stimuli in oddball paradigms. In an oddball paradigm,
stimuli of lower relative probability called deviants are presented
within pseudo-randomly structured streams of higher relative
probability stimuli called standards. Participants are usually
asked to detect a particular type of deviant stimulus called target.
Target detection is classically associated with an instance of
the P300 –the P3b– maximal over parietal areas of the scalp,
commonly accepted as an index of conscious target detection
and working memory updating (see e.g., Donchin, 1981; Polich,
2007). In the present study, we used the P3b as an index of target-
likeness for the words all and some, the latter depending on the
instructions provided to the participant at the beginning of each
block. In other words, the P3b provided a quantitative, objective,
1Note that in fact the response pattern does not always appear bimodal and that
some participants can be wholly inconsistent within an experiment. However,
criteria for grouping participants vary from one study to another, and inter-
individual variation is not always reported.
and context-free measure of the ease with which participants
implemented the pragmatic or literal interpretation of some,
when instructed to do so. Thus, we expected the amplitude
of the P3b to increase proportionally to the target-likeness of
some under different instructions, that is, it would measure
the effectiveness with which participants acted pragmatically or
literally. Furthermore, the absence of a “pragmatic N400” in
the study by Nieuwland et al. (2010) might relate to strategic
effects: Participants who show no significant “pragmatic N400”
might have rapidly become aware that half of the sentences
starting with some were strange and made sense only after
the comma. This might have reduced N400 amplitude because
under-informativeness gradually became more expected with
time. The P3b is thus arguably a better index since its amplitude
does not decrease with time.
In the ERP experiment, participants were presented with
single quantifiers or numerals (ALL, SOME, ONE, TWO, NONE,
or THREE), printed in white and green letters on a black
background. Sometimes the number of green letters within a
word stimulus matched its meaning (e.g., ALL printed with all
of its three letters in green) and sometimes there was a mismatch
(e.g., ALL printed with only some of its letters in green). In half
of the blocks, participants were instructed to consider the word
SOME printed with all its letters in green (ambiguous-SOME) as
a mismatch (because not some, but all letters are green) and in
the other blocks as a match (because if all of its letters are green,
then some of them necessarily are). The unambiguous match or
mismatch stimulus ALL served as control and we manipulated
the ratio of match and mismatch stimuli so as to obtain an
oddball distribution prone to eliciting a P3b. Experimental blocks
were of two types, based on whether participants had to detect
match words within a stream of mismatch ones (match target
blocks) or mismatch words within a stream of match ones
(mismatch target blocks). The full design of the ERP experiment
is depicted in Table 2 in Section 2.2.2.
Before being engaged in the oddball paradigm, participants
completed a questionnaire assessing their pragmatic tolerance
based on acceptability judgements (how strongly they agree or
disagree with under-informative statements such as “Some circles
are round”). The questionnaire also assessed Autism-Spectrum
Quotient, Empathy Quotient, Interpersonal Reactivity Index and
Systemizing Quotient in order to shed light on the personality
traits or cognitive style that could account for tolerance or
intolerance to pragmatic violations.
From a behavioral point of view, in the ERP experiment, we
expected a general facilitation effect when some was to be taken
in its literal interpretation as observed in a number of previous
studies (see e.g., Noveck and Posada, 2003; Bott and Noveck,
2004; De Neys and Schaeken, 2007; Chevallier et al., 2008; Bott
et al., 2012). We did not have any prediction regarding possible
relationships between the participants’ pragmatic tolerance as
measured by the questionnaire and behavioral data. In contrast,
we expected to find a relationship between pragmatic tolerance
and the magnitude of the P3b effect elicited by the critical
ambiguous stimulus SOME, depending on whether it was to be
considered literal or pragmatic. More specifically, if SOMEwas to
be taken literally, we expected the magnitude of the P3b effect to
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be particularly pronounced for literal responders and less so for
pragmatic ones, whereas the reverse pattern should be observed
when SOME was to be taken pragmatically.
2. METHODS
2.1. Participants
Fifty-two native speakers of English (33 females; mean age= 21.2,
SD = 4.7) gave written consent to take part in the experiment
approved by the Ethics Committee of Bangor University, United
Kingdom. All were students from the School of Psychology and
were given course credits for their participation. All had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision. No EEG data was recorded for one
participant due to a technical fault and the data of 12 participants
had to be dismissed due to excessive artifacts (see Section 2.4 for
details). Therefore, statistical analyses of ERP results are based
on 39 individual datasets, and behavioral results (reaction times
and accuracy) on 38 individual datasets because one behavioral
dataset was missing due to a technical error.
2.2. Materials
2.2.1. Questionnaire
The questionnaire comprised the 50 statements of the Autism-
Spectrum Quotient questionnaire (henceforth AQ), the 60
statements of the Empathy Quotient questionnaire (EQ), the 75
statements of the Systemizing Quotient-Revised questionnaire
(SQ-R), the 28 statements of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index
(IRI) and 40 all- or some-statements.
The AQ, EQ, IRI, and SQ-R are self-report questionnaires for
use with adults with normal intelligence.
The AQ measures the degree to which a person presents
the traits associated with the autistic spectrum (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2001). It includes 10 statements from the 5 following
sub-scales: social skill, attention switching, attention to detail,
imagination and communication. Given the topic of this study
and the results obtained by Nieuwland et al. (2010) , we focused
on the communication sub-scale of the AQ.
The EQ measures individual differences in empathy (Baron-
Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004). It comprises 40 empathy items
and 20 filler items. The EQ does not distinguish affective from
cognitive empathy; nevertheless, SI derivation does not appear
related to affective empathy but rather to some form of mind-
reading akin to cognitive empathy (see e.g., Pijnacker et al., 2009).
Therefore, we also included the IRI, which is another instrument
developed in order to measure individual differences in empathy,
assessing 4 different areas (with 7 items per area): empathic
concern, personal distress, fantasy, and perspective-taking (Davis,
1980, 1983). The first two areas concern affective empathy whilst
the two others relate to cognitive empathy. Since step 2 of SI
derivation entails evaluating the epistemic state of the speaker,
we focused on the perspective-taking sub-scale.
Finally, the SQ-R measures individual differences in
systemizing, that is the ability to analyse systems, extract
rules, and predict system outputs (Wheelwright et al., 2006;
Baron-Cohen, 2008, 2009, 2011). We included this measure
to test the hypothesis that high systemizing ability can help
reject under-informative statements. This idea arose from our
reading of studies investigating high-functioning individuals
with autism and Asperger’s syndrome (e.g., Pijnacker et al.,
2009), individuals who are very good at systemizing (see e.g.,
Wheelwright et al., 2006). Despite their associated high score
on the AQ communication sub-scale, they appear to derive
SIs as often as control participants, although the high AQ
communication score predict poorer pragmatic skills (Pijnacker
et al., 2009; Chevallier et al., 2010; see also Nieuwland et al., 2010,
p. 343).
The 40 all- or some-statements were either true or false but,
in the case of some-statements, possibly under-informative (i.e.,
logically true but pragmatically infelicitous). There were 10 such
some-statements, 10 true and 10 false control all-statements, and
5 true and 5 false control some-statements. We computed a
Pragmatism score on the basis of the responses to the 10 under-
informative some-statements. As in Noveck (2001) and Feeney
et al. (2004) , participants were randomly assigned to one of two
lists in order to minimize item-driven effects2 (see Table 1 for
examples of statements and Table A1 in Appendix A for the full
lists). Some of the statements were taken from previous studies
(Noveck and Posada, 2003; Feeney et al., 2004; Banga et al., 2009;
Nieuwland et al., 2010).
Participants were asked to choose between “strongly agree,”
“slightly agree,” “slightly disagree,” or “strongly disagree” in
response to each statement (we adapted the 5-level scale of the IRI
to fit this scale used in the AQ, EQ, and SQ-R). The all- and some-
statements weremixed with AQ, EQ, SQ-R, and IRI statements so
as to reduce consistency within-task effects (see Section 1, see also
Feeney et al., 2004, p. 127). We thus used the same 4-level scale
for the all- and some-statements as for the AQ, EQ, SQ-R, and IRI
statements. Furthermore, we assumed that using a 4-level scale
for critical under-informative some-statements might increase
sensitivity as compared to a binary forced-choice (true/false).
“Strongly agree” answers to these statements were scored 0,
“slightly agree” answers were scored 1, “slightly disagree” answers
were scored 2 and “strongly disagree” answers were scored 3.
Therefore, the range of Pragmatism score was 0–30, low scores
indicating tolerance to pragmatic violations and high scores
indicating intolerance to such violations.
2.2.2. ERP Experiment
Using the words all, some, none, one, two, and three we
constructed 12 stimuli using white and green letters, the number
of green letters being consistent or not with the meaning of
the word (see Figure A1 in Appendix B). Using a bold typeface
to represent letters presented in green and a light typeface
to represent letters presented in white, match stimuli were:
ALL, SOME, NONE, ONE, TWO, THREE, and mismatches
were: ALL, SOME, ONE, NONE, TWO, THREE. In addition,
SOME was used as the ambiguous test stimulus, since it
could be interpreted either literally (a match) or pragmatically
(a mismatch).
2We followed the same procedure as in Noveck (2001) and Feeney et al. (2004)
: by switching the quantifier, true universals of list one became test existentials in
list two, and test existentials of list one became true universal in list two; 5 false
universals of list one the 5 true existentials in list two, and the 5 true existentials of
list one 5 false universals in list two.
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TABLE 1 | Examples of all- and some-statements used in the
questionnaire.
Condition Example
Test existentials Some circles are round
True universals All infants are young
False universals All animals are black
True existentials Some children are blonde
False existentials Some books are good to eat
There were 4 experimental blocks conforming to the structure
of a classic oddball design. Two blocks were match target blocks
in which most stimuli were mismatches and infrequent ones
were matches, which were the blocks’ targets, and 2 blocks
were mismatch target blocks in which standards were matches
and infrequent mismatches were the targets. Ambiguous-SOME
(SOME) appeared in both the block types with its status as
target or standard depending on the instructions given to the
participants at the beginning of each block (see Section 2.3).
The experiment thus conformed to a 2 × 2 factorial design
manipulating Block type (match target or mismatch target) and
Instructions (pragmatic or literal interpretation of some, and
consequently target or standard status of some in the block).
Within each block (match target—pragmatic some,match target—
literal some, mismatch target—pragmatic some and mismatch
target—literal some) participants saw: 30 control target-ALL, 30
ambiguous-SOME, and 18 filler targets NONE, ONE, TWO,
THREE and SOME. A target or an ambiguous-SOME stimulus
was preceded by 3, 4, or 5 pseudo-randomly selected standards
(312 in total, 52 of each individual type). There was thus 390
stimuli per block, that is, 312 standards, 30 control targets ALL,
30 ambiguous-SOME, and 18 filler targets. In other words, 20%
of the stimuli were deviant targets in the two conditions in which
ambiguous-SOME was a target, and 12.3% in the two conditions
in which ambiguous-SOME was a standard, see Table 2 below.
2.3. Procedure
During EEG cap installation, participants rated a random
sequence of the 253 statements of the questionnaire. They were
instructed to indicate how strongly they agreed or disagreed
with each statement by pressing one of 4 buttons on a
response box. They were told that there was no right or wrong
answer3. Participants generally needed 20–30 min to complete
the questionnaire, which generally provided enough time to set
the EEG cap.
Participants were then instructed tomonitor stimuli presented
in the center of a 19′′ CRT monitor in Arial Narrow size 14
points subtending around 1◦ of visual angle and to press a button
if the stimulus differed from the most common type presented
within a block. For instance in thematch target—pragmatic some
block, participants were instructed to press a button for match
stimuli (such as ALL or ONE) and ignore mismatch stimuli
(such as ALL, SOME, NONE, ONE, TWO, THREE). They were
3The instructions were “Please read each statement carefully and rate how strongly
you agree or disagree with it by pressing the corresponding button. There are no
right or wrong answers. Please answer as spontaneously as possible.”
TABLE 2 | Design of the ERP experiment.
Instruction some literal some pragmatic
Block type Match
target
Mismatch
target
Match
target
Mismatch
target
Target stimuli SOME SOME
ALL ALL ALL ALL
SOME SOME SOME SOME
NONE NONE NONE NONE
ONE ONE ONE ONE
TWO TWO TWO TWO
THREE THREE THREE THREE
Standard stimuli SOME SOME
ALL ALL ALL ALL
SOME SOME SOME SOME
NONE NONE NONE NONE
ONE ONE ONE ONE
TWO TWO TWO TWO
THREE THREE THREE THREE
particularly instructed about SOME, which was to be considered
a mismatch (and thus ignored) because “not some, but all letters
are in green.” In thematch target—literal some block, instructions
were the same as above, with the exception of the particular
instruction about SOME, which was to be considered a match
(and thus a target) because “some letters are indeed green.” The
pragmatic some and literal some mismatch target blocks were a
mirror image of the two previously described ones, such that
standards were now match stimuli (ALL, SOME, NONE, ONE,
TWO, THREE) and targets were mismatch stimuli (e.g., ALL,
THREE). Under pragmatic instruction, SOME was thus to be
considered a mismatch target and responded to, and under literal
instruction it was to be considered a match standard and ignored,
hence its instruction-dependent status.
Block types (match target or mismatch target) order and
Instructions (literal or pragmatic interpretation of some first)
were rotated between participants (8 combinations). Response
side was counterbalanced between participants. There was a
break between blocks and a short familiarization with specific
instructions at the beginning of each block. Each stimulus was
presented for 1300 ms or until participant’s response, whichever
was the shortest, with a randomly selected inter-stimulus interval
of 160, 180, 200, 220, or 240 ms to reduce cross-trial ERP
contamination. Participants needed around 40min to complete
the task.
2.4. EEG Recording and Analysis
Electrophysiological data were recorded continuously at a
rate of 1 kHz in reference to electrode CZ from 64Ag/AgCl
electrodes using SynAmp2 amplifiers (Neuroscan Inc., El Paso,
TX, USA). Electrodes were attached to an elastic cap (EasycapTM,
Herrsching, Germany) and placed according to the extended
10–20 convention. The ground electrode was placed at FPZ.
Bipolar electrodes were placed to the left of the left eye and to
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 September 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1479
Barbet and Thierry Alternatives in the Neurocognition of Some
the right of the right eye (HEOG) and above and below the right
eye (VEOG). Signals were filtered on-line between 0.01 and 200
Hz. Impedances were kept below 5 k for the 64 electrodes
and below 10 k for the eye electrodes. Before segmentation,
the EEG was processed through a low-pass filter with a cut-
off frequency of 20 Hz and a high-pass filter of 0.1 Hz. Eye
blinks were mathematically corrected based on the procedure
advocated by Gratton et al. (1983) . After correction, any trial
with amplitude exceeding ± 100 µV at any point within an
epoch and at any recording site except VEOG and HEOG was
discarded from analysis. The EEG was then segmented into
epochs ranging from −100 to 1000 ms after stimulus onset.
Baseline correction was performed in reference to pre-stimulus
activity, and individual averages were digitally re-referenced to
the global average reference. EEG data processing was done using
Scan Edit 4.5 (Neuroscan Inc.). Twelve individual datasets were
discarded due to excessive noise and/or alpha contamination
leading to undetectable early components (P1–N1 complex) in
two ormore of the blocks. In the remaining 39 datasets, one block
was missing due to a technical error and one block with less than
17 accepted trials was discarded, leading to an average number of
trials per condition of 28.6 (SD= 2).
We expected a delayed P300 effect because of the nature of
the task (see e.g., Fosker and Thierry, 2005; Delplanque et al.,
2006; Polich, 2007; Thierry and Kotz, 2008; Otterbein et al., 2012;
Wu and Thierry, 2013; Sassenhagen et al., 2014). Differences
in the early P300 range (P3a) were not analyzed because no
clearly differentiated peak was identified. Inspection of the grand-
average ERP waveforms at the predicted electrode location of
maximal amplitude (PZ, see e.g., Duncan-Johnson and Kopell,
1981; Polich, 2007; Sassenhagen et al., 2014) revealed that the
main peak in the later P300 range (P3b) was delayed by about 100
ms in themismatch target as compared to thematch target blocks
(grand-average peak latencies 620 and 515 ms, respectively). This
delay could be expected considering reaction times differences
between blocks (see Section 3.2.2). P3b mean amplitudes were
computed and analyzed in 150 ms-wide windows around the
average peak latency calculated in match and mismatch block
types separately: 440–590 ms in match target blocks and 550–
700 ms in mismatch target blocks, based on visual inspection of
variations of the Mean Global Field Power measured across the
scalp (Picton et al., 2000; Luck, 2005). P3b mean amplitudes were
measured at electrode locations PZ, POZ, PO3, PO4.
3. RESULTS
3.1. Pragmatism Score
Out of a maximum of 30, Pragmatism scores of the 39
participants kept for statistical analyses of ERP results ranged
from 0 to 29 (M = 5.48, SD = 8.35). Pragmatism scores did
not allow us to split the participants into two groups (pragmatic
vs. literal responders) because 8 of them scored the median
value of 1.
3.2. Behavioral Results
3.2.1. Accuracy
Hit rates were high overall (91.3 %, SD = 28.2). The
proportions of correct responses per block types (match target
and mismatch target) and stimulus conditions (target-ALL and
ambiguous-SOME, the latter could be considered either a
target or a standard depending on the blocks’ instructions) are
presented in Figure 1.
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FIGURE 1 | Correct responses to target-ALL and ambiguous-SOME depending on the match or mismatch target Block type (error bars represent
SEM). (A) Correct responses to target-ALL and ambiguous-SOME. (B) Correct responses to ambiguous-SOME depending on its status in the block
(standard or target). ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
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Hit rates were analyzed using logit mixed models4 (see e.g.,
Jaeger, 2008) including the maximal random effect structure
justified by the design and by model comparison5, namely
by-subject random intercepts and by-subject random slopes for
Block type for all models.
The first model revealed a significant Block type × Stimulus
interaction (z = 5.24, p < 0.001), see Figure 1A. Analyses for
the stimuli separately showed a significantly higher accuracy
in match relative to mismatch target blocks for target-ALL
(z = 5.48, p < 0.001), see Figure 1A. For ambiguous-SOME,
there was a significant interaction Block type × Status (target
or standard in the block) (z = −7.47, p < 0.001), see
Figure 1B.
When SOME was intended as a target (literal interpretation
in match target block, and pragmatic interpretation in mismatch
target block), participantsmademore errors in themismatch than
match target block (z = −3.1, p < 0.01), see Figure 1B, there
was no interaction with Pragmatism score. When SOME was
intended as a standard, and thus was to be ignored (pragmatic
interpretation in match target block, and literal interpretation
in mismatch target block), there was no significant difference
between mismatch and match target blocks (z = 1.36, p = 0.18),
see Figure 1B, nor any interaction with Pragmatism score.
3.2.2. Reaction Times
This analysis only concerns reaction times for the stimuli ALL
and SOME to which participants had to respond, that is target-
ALL and target-SOME, in the blocks in which both were targets.
Figure 2 depicts reaction times (in ms) per Block type and
Stimulus.
Reaction times were analyzed using linear mixed models6 (see
e.g, Bates, 2005; Baayen et al., 2008; Baayen and Milin, 2010)
including maximal random structure justified by the design and
supported by the data: by-subject random intercepts and by-
subject random slopes for Block type × Stimulus (or for Block
type or for Stimulus). Reaction times were transformed according
to the Box-Cox power transformation7: 1/sqrt(RT). The final
models included removal of outliers (data points with absolute
standardized residuals exceeding 2.5 standard deviations, see e.g,
Baayen and Milin, 2010).
The first model showed a significant interaction between
Block type and Stimulus [F(1, 37.17) = 4.16, p < 0.05]
8, see
Figure 2. Separate analyses for the target stimuli showed a
significant effect of Block type for target-ALL [F(1, 34.18) =
276.67, p < 0.001]. This effect was found for target-SOME
too [F(1, 34.36) = 165.77, p < 0.001], however there was no
interaction with Pragmatism score, even though such interaction
could have been expected for this stimulus. The effect of Block
type on reaction times for both target-ALL and target-SOME
4Logit mixed models fitted using the R (R Core Team, 2014) package lme4 (Bates
et al., 2014).
5See e.g., Barr et al. (2013).
6Linearmixedmodels fitted using the R package lmerTest (Kuznetsova et al., 2014).
7We used the boxcox function of the R package MASS (see Venables and Ripley,
2002) to determine the suitable transformation.
8We used the anova function of lmerTest which provides analysis of variance tables
of type 3 with denominator degrees of freedom calculated based on Satterthwaite’s
approximation.
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FIGURE 2 | Reaction times to target-ALL and target-SOME depending
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95% confidence interval for comparing medians (see e.g., McGill et al., 1978).
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corroborates the facilitation effect of match target blocks
observed on hit rates.
Analyses for the Block types separately showed a
significant effect of target Stimulus in the match target block
[F(1, 36.27) = 24, p < 0.001]. However, this effect was only
marginal in the mismatch target block [F(1, 34.93) = 3.4, p =
0.07]. There was no interaction with Pragmatism score, even
though such an interaction could have been expected here also.
In sum, mismatch target detection led to longer reaction times
than match target detection (by about 170 ms). Furthermore,
regardless of tolerance to pragmatic violations as indexed by
Pragmatism score, when participants were instructed to take
some in its literal interpretation (match target block), they needed
more time to respond to target-SOME than to target-ALL
(by about 30 ms), but the difference between target-ALL and
target-SOME was smaller (about 18 ms) when they had to
consider target-SOME in its pragmatic interpretation (mismatch
target block). This suggests that the facilitation effect of
the literal interpretation of target-SOME compared with its
pragmatic interpretation observed on hit rates only reflects
the general facilitation effect of the Block type (match target
compared with mismatch target). Furthermore, the increase of
accuracy accompanied by the slowdown of response speed (when
comparing target-SOME with the control target-ALL) in the
match target block resembles a speed-accuracy trade-off.
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3.3. ERP Results (P3b)
Grand-average ERP waveforms are displayed in Figure 3.
Grand-average difference ERP waveforms and topographies of
the P3b effect elicited by target-ALL and ambiguous-SOME are
displayed in Figures 5, 6, respectively.
P3b mean amplitudes and P3b mean effects were analyzed
using linear mixed models including maximal crossed random
effects justified by the data (see Barr et al., 2013, and Sections
3.2.1, 3.2.2). The random structures were kept maximal for
all of the models, that is by-subject random intercepts with
by-subject random slopes for all of the fixed effects, and
by-electrode random intercepts, but for the first model of
analysis of the P3b effects for which the complex random
structure had to be simplified, see below. The final models
included removal of outliers (data points with absolute
standardized residuals exceeding 2.5 standard deviations, see
Section 3.2.2).
We first analyzed the P3b mean amplitudes elicited by the 3
different Stimulus types (standard, target-ALL and ambiguous-
SOME) in the 4 experimental blocks, see Figure 3. We conducted
the analyses by block because of the dual status of ambiguous-
SOME (target or standard, see left and right panels in Figure 3),
and because the standards were different in the different Block
types (mismatch or match target, see upper and lower panels in
Figure 3).
In all four blocks, the effect of Stimulus type was significant
(match target block with literal target-SOME, see Figure 3A:
F(2, 38.13) = 30.71, p < 0.001; match target block with
pragmatic standard-SOME, see Figure 3B: F(2, 38.04) = 60.87,
p < 0.001; mismatch target block with pragmatic target-SOME,
see Figure 3C: F(2, 37.04) = 28.16, p < 0.001; mismatch
target block with literal standard-SOME, see Figure 3D:
F(2, 37.07) = 10.88, p < 0.001); differences between stimuli with
estimates of the mixed models in µV and p-values adjusted are
presented in Table 3, and mean P3b amplitudes in Figure 4).
As expected, in all four blocks, mean P3b amplitudes increased
for targets as compared with standards. In the blocks in which
both ALL and SOME were targets (Figures 3A,C), there was no
significant difference between the mean P3b amplitudes elicited
by these two stimuli. In the blocks in which only ALL was a target
(Figures 3B,D), there was no difference between standard-SOME
and the other standards in the mismatch target block; but
standard-SOME elicited significantly larger P3b amplitudes than
other standards in thematch target block (Figure 3B). Moreover,
there was a significant difference between P3b amplitudes elicited
by standard-SOME and target-ALL in the match target block
(Figure 3B), but only a marginal one in themismatch target block
(Figure 3D).
In sum, our oddball paradigm delivered the expected effects,
but standard-SOME in the match target block elicited high
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P3b amplitude (Figure 3B). In this block, the targets were
matches and SOMEwas to be considered pragmatically, therefore
a mismatch, and thus be ignored. Participants managed to
ignore the pragmatically mismatched version of SOME very well
(accuracy: 90.7%, see Section 3.2.1) but ERPs look as if they
had been elicited by a target. However, the difference between
standard-SOME and target-ALL in themismatch target block was
also less than expected (Figure 3D). In this block in which the
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FIGURE 6 | P3b effect topographies elicited by target-ALL and ambiguous-SOME in match target (A,B, 440–590ms) and mismatch target (C,D,
550–700ms) blocks. (A,C) ambiguous-SOME as target; (B,D) ambiguous-SOME as standard. In italics: the context of interpretation of ambiguous-SOME.
only target was ALL, SOME had to be considered literally, so
a match and thus had to be ignored. The participants managed
to ignore standard-SOME very well (accuracy 93.4%), but
although corresponding P3b amplitudes were not significantly
different from those elicited by the other standards, they only
marginally differed from those elicited by target-ALL. We
further discuss these results below. Recall that standard-SOME
was rarer than the other standards in the blocks (see Section
2.2.2).
In order to investigate the effect of the interpretation of
ambiguous-SOME (literal or pragmatic), we calculated P3b
effects: target-ALL P3b minus standards P3b, and ambiguous-
SOME P3b minus standards P3b; see Figure 5 for grand-
average difference ERP waveforms and Figure 6 for P3b effect
topographies.
The first regression model revealed a significant 4-way
interaction between Block type (match or mismatch target),
Status of SOME (target or standard in the experimental block),
Stimulus (target-ALL or ambiguous-SOME) and Pragmatism
score [F(1, 1039.86)
9 = 6.97, p< 0.01].
Analyses for target-ALL and ambiguous-SOME separately
showed a significant effect of Block type for target-ALL
[F(1, 37.85) = 25.56, p < 0.001] and no effect of, or interaction
with, the status of SOME in the block or Pragmatism score.
In sum, the P3b effect elicited by target-ALL was reduced in
mismatch target blocks, regardless of Pragmatism score, and
regardless of the status of SOME.
As regards ambiguous-SOME, the first model showed the
expected 3-way interaction between Block type (match or
mismatch target), Status of SOME (target or standard in the
block) and Pragmatism score [F(1, 39.4) = 5.67, p < 0.05].
9The random structure had to be simplified for this model and therefore does not
include the 3-way interaction Block type × Status of SOME × Stimulus as by-
subject random slope but only the Block type and the Status of SOME × Stimulus
interaction. This simplification was determined based on the rand function of
lmerTest (Kuznetsova et al., 2014).
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There was also a significant effect of Block Type [F(1, 36.96) =
7.72, p < 0.01] and a significant effect of Status [F(1, 37.03) =
20.2, p < 0.001], but no significant interaction between the two
[F(1, 37.45) = 2.18, p = 0.15]. These effects, and the absence
of interaction between them, suggest that whereas standard-
SOME elicited the expected reduced P3b effects as compared with
target-SOME, it was not processed as a typical standard (it was
rarer than the other standards) in any of the blocks. Furthermore,
it must be noted that SOME was a target in other blocks, it was
the only stimulus highlighted by special instructions and was
thus task-relevant stimulus even when it was a standard and
required no response. The difference that one can see on the
figures between standard-SOME in the match (Figures 5B, 6B)
and themismatch target blocks (Figures 5D, 6D) is similar to that
found for target-SOME and target-ALL when comparing across
blocks. In other words, this effect is probably one of Block type
rather than an effect of the interpretation of SOME, see below.
Analyses for standard-SOME and target-SOME separately
showed, for standard-SOME, only a marginal effect of Block
type [F(1, 37.83) = 3.46, p = 0.07]. The P3b effect elicited by
standard-SOME decreased by only 0.78 µV (model estimate) in
the mismatch target block (SOME standard match in its literal
interpretation, Figures 5D, 6D) compared with the match target
block (SOME standard mismatch in its pragmatic interpretation,
Figures 5B, 6B). We expected here a possible interaction with
Pragmatism score but found none.
As regards target-SOME, analyses revealed the expected
significant interaction between Block type and Pragmatism score
[F(1, 36.88) = 6.72, p < 0.05]. Analyses for the Block types
separately showed a significant effect of Pragmatism score on
P3b effect elicited by target-SOME in the match target block
[literal interpretation of some, Figures 5A, 6A, F(1, 37) = 4.55,
p < 0.05], but no effect of Pragmatism score on P3b effect
elicited by target-SOME in the mismatch target block (pragmatic
interpretation of some, Figures 5C, 6C, p > 0.3). In sum, the
expected effect of Pragmatism score was only measurable when
TABLE 3 | Differences in P3b mean amplitudes.
Block type Estimate (SE) p
MATCH TARGET
Standard vs. target-ALL 3.27 (0.42) <0.001
Standard vs. target-SOME 2.94 (0.43) <0.001
Target-ALL vs. target-SOME −0.33 (0.27) n.s
Standard vs. target-ALL 3.71 (0.34) < 0.001
Standard vs. standard-SOME 1.26 (0.39) <0.01
Standard-SOME vs. target-ALL 2.45 (0.39) <0.001
MISMATCH TARGET
Standard vs. target-ALL 1.42 (0.36) <0.01
Standard vs. target-SOME 2.04 (0.27) <0.001
Target-ALL vs. target-SOME 0.63 (0.34) n.s
Standard vs. target-ALL 1.36 (0.30) <0.001
Standard vs. standard-SOME 0.52 (0.25) n.s.
Standard-SOME vs. target-ALL 0.84 (0.35) <0.1
Estimates (in µV) and p-values adjusted (Bonferroni’s correction).
participants had to take target-SOME in its literal interpretation
(match target block, Figures 5A, 6A). In this condition, the P3b
effect elicited by target-SOME decreased with an increase in
Pragmatism score, see Figure 7.
3.4. Questionnaire
We looked at the results of the 52 participants who completed
the questionnaire and included in the analysis the four
independent variables of interest: SQ-R score, EQ score, IRI-
PT score (perspective-taking sub-scale) and AQ-Comm score
(communication sub-scale)10. A generalized linear model (with
inverse Gaussian/Wald distribution (link function 1/µ2) as
exponential family) revealed that SQ-R score was the only
significant predictor of Pragmatism score [t(52) = −2.206, p
= 0.032; see in Appendix C, Figure A2 for the distribution,
mean, median, SD and skewness values of the dependent
and independent variables derived from the questionnaire, and
Table A2 for estimates and model comparison]. Pragmatism
score tended to increase with an increase in SQ-R score.
Systemizing Quotient-Revised score significantly predicted some
of the variance in Pragmatism score, whilst the other parameters
failed to predict any part of it11.
10We verified that there was no problem of multicollinearity calculating the
variance inflation factors using the vif function of the R package car (Fox and
Weisberg, 2011).
11Fitting linear models with transformed Pragmatism score (1/Pragmatism score2)
which satisfy all of the linear model assumptions as assessed by the function
gvlma of the R package gvlma (Pena and Slate, 2014) (whereas linear models
with untransformed Pragmatism score led to comparable results but violated the
normality of the error distribution assumption), we obtained similar results. R2
final linear model (SQ-R only predictor): 0.11. η2p initial linear model: SQ-R: 0.13,
EQ: 0.001, PT: 0.03, AQ-Comm: 0.001.
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4. DISCUSSION
4.1. Behavioral Responses
Participants made fewer errors when target-SOME was to be
taken in its literal (at-least-some) rather than its pragmatic
(some-but-not-all) interpretation. This result is consistent with
the pervasive literal interpretation facilitation effect in sentence
verification tasks (see e.g., Noveck and Posada, 2003; Bott and
Noveck, 2004; De Neys and Schaeken, 2007; Chevallier et al.,
2008; Bott et al., 2012). However, in our design, when ambiguous-
SOME was a target, interpretation (literal or pragmatic) and
block context (match or mismatch target) were confounded, and
the mismatch target experimental context led to generally more
errors, that is also for unambiguous target-ALL. In other words,
it was easier to detect match targets amidst mismatch standards
than the reverse.
Turning to reaction times, when participants were instructed
to take some in its literal interpretation (match target block),
they needed more time to respond to target-SOME than to
target-ALL, but the difference between the two target types
was smaller when they had to consider target-SOME in its
pragmatic interpretation (mismatch target block). This confirms
that the literal facilitation effect observed on hit rates reflects a
general facilitation effect of experimental context (Block type).
Furthermore, taken together, the increase in hit rates and the
slowdown in response speed for literal target-SOME resembles
a speed-accuracy trade-off.
We consider here that the literal interpretation facilitation
effect found previously in sentence verification tasks might
be a general effect of context: it is easier to respond to a
“true”/matching than a “false”/mismatching stimulus, even when
the response required is the same (as in experiment 2 in
Bott and Noveck, 2004, see below). In our experiment, the
ambiguous stimulus SOME was always the same: it appeared
with all its letters in green. However, it required a response
in the match target block because it was a match and in
the mismatch target block because it was a mismatch. In
sentence verification tasks, participants have to respond e.g.,
“true” or “false” to Some elephants are mammals, or “agree”
to Mary says the following sentence is true/false Some elephants
are mammals (Bott and Noveck, 2004). In any case, SOME
presented in isolation and statements such as Some elephants
are mammals are under-informative, and some studies pointed
out that the infelicity of under-informativeness probably never
goes unnoticed (Feeney et al., 2004; Antoniou and Katsos,
2011, see Section 1). When interpretation is constrained by
instructions, responding pragmatically, that is dealing with
“false”/mismatching items, appears a harder task than responding
literally, that is dealing with “true”/matching items. When
interpretation is not constrained, participants can opt for the
easy or the harder task based on extraneous variables. In other
words, we suggest here that the observed cognitive cost of the
pragmatic interpretation of some in sentence verification tasks
may not entirely originate in deriving the scalar inference per se
(Bott andNoveck, 2004; Bott et al., 2012) but also in the particular
task involved (see also Marty and Chemla, 2013).
4.2. P3b Brain Responses
The P3b is a late peaking positive wave from the P300 family of
components (see e.g., Donchin, 1981; Polich, 2007). Its amplitude
tends to increase with the propensity of a stimulus to disrupt
a sequence of repetitive or ordered events within a predictable
sequence. The P3b is expected to be of maximum amplitude
in response to stimuli that are most target-like, especially if a
response is to be produced by the participant, when stimuli
and/or task complexity requires extended processing beyond
mere perceptual processing and categorization.
P3b brain responses recorded for the control target stimulus
all corroborated the effect of experimental context observed on
hit rates and response times. It was easier to detect match items
amidst mismatch items than the reverse. For the target some,
there was an interaction between task specific demands and
Pragmatism score. Brain responses to some literal in the match
target context decreased with an increase in Pragmatism score.
In other words, the more intolerant to pragmatic violations the
participant, the weaker the P3b response to literal target some.
As regards the pragmatic interpretation of some in the mismatch
target block, no effect of Pragmatism score on P3b effect elicited
by the target was measurable. As for the case of some when it was
a standard, we found no interaction with Pragmatism score.
Brain responses corroborated behavioral results: it is more
difficult to detect mismatches amid matches than matches amid
mismatches, from a semantic or a pragmatic point of view. We
found no tangible evidence of cost or delay associated with
scalar inference computation (having to infer “not all” from
some) per se when controlling for specific task demands. In
this sense, our results are inconsistent with a two-step context-
driven model (literal meaning first and optional SI enrichment)
as experimental pragmatics has it. Tomlinson et al. (2013) found
that when verifying under-informative sentences such as “Some
elephants are mammals,” average mouse paths initially moved
toward “true” before they changed direction to select “false.” They
concluded that SIs are understood in two steps: literal and then
pragmatic. However, it is difficult to understand why they invoke
such two-step processing model only for “Some elephants are
mammals” and not for “No elephants are insects” which produces
a comparable response delay. The task seems equally difficult
in both cases: there are two consistent linguistic-semantic cues
but the response to produce is inconsistent with them (see
Urbach and Kutas, 2010; Urbach et al., 2015, for ERP evidence
of partial incremental interpretation of quantifiers; and Clark
and Chase, 1972, on the processing of “double negative”). Let’s
imagine a simplified incremental algorithm behind a sentence
verification task. For instance, in the case of “Some elephants
are mammals”: some (EXIST) elephants are mammals (EXIST),
intended response is “false.” For “No elephants are insects”: no
(¬EXIST) elephants are insects (¬EXIST), intended response is
“true.” Thus, the observed delay may be due to the fact that the
response intended has been counter-primed twice. And indeed,
this never happened in the other control sentences in Tomlinson
et al. (2013) . Arguably, judging “No elephants are insects” as
“true” is not a pragmatic response because it corresponds to the
truth value or logical value, of the sentence. But, it could also
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be argued that the spontaneous interpretation of “No elephants
are insects” is “false.” The double negation elimination may be
a valid rule of classical logic (the so-called rule of replacement
or inference, related to the principle of non-contradiction) but it
is not systematically applied, as in the case of the non-standard
but frequent double negative in English (e.g., I didn’t say nothing)
which resolves to a negative. In sum, whatever the position one
adopts, it is difficult to see why the processing of “Some elephants
are mammals” (“false”) would be less “automatic” than the
processing of “No elephants are insects” (“true”). The “automatic”
computational process appears nonetheless to be more than a
one-stage process in sentence verification tasks: it involves (i)
accessing the quantifier’s value, (ii) computing the semantics
of the embedded proposition, (iii) computing the relationship
between the quantifier and the embedded proposition (with a
literal output for the some-sentence and a wrong/contradictory
output for the no-sentence), and (iv) evaluating the truth value
of the sentence in the world. The third stage is easy to complete
(EXIST + EXIST = true, or ¬EXIST + ¬EXIST = false), but
the output of fourth stage must be the reverse of the previous
stage in order to comply with world knowledge. This might
explain why children tend to respond true to under-informative
statements such as “Some elephants are mammals” more often
than adults, and why adults under cognitive load (De Neys and
Schaeken, 2007; Marty and Chemla, 2013) or time pressure (Bott
and Noveck, 2004; Chevallier et al., 2008) do the same: they
are making errors. More generally, the underlying process could
be something like “if there is a mismatch or a contradiction
resolve it,” and what is important is the value of the mismatch or
contradiction to resolve. It could explain why we can encourage
adults to be more “logical,” and children to be more “pragmatic”
(see e.g., Noveck, 2001). It could also explain why a child so
spontaneously says that Charlotte who has eaten all of the sweets
is a liar when she says that she has eaten some of them (see
Feeney et al., 2004): the brain is more interested in this than in
verifying “Some elephants are mammals” because the former has
some value. In this sense, the process is also “context-driven.”
Recall that certain specific semantic contexts such as antecedents
of conditionals seem to block the “not all” interpretation of
some, and that in contexts in which the speaker is assumed to
have insufficient knowledge of the situation, the hearer does not
necessarily access the “not all” interpretation (see Section 1).
The relationship between P3b amplitude and Pragmatism
score provided insights into inter-individual variability. Along
with a higher Pragmatism score, ambiguous-SOME (SOME)
was less evident as a match target. This result suggests that
P3b amplitude is a sensitive measure of cognitive flexibility
and task adaptation. Participants generally managed to switch
extremely well from one experimental block to another (match
or mismatch target and literal or pragmatic interpretation of
some). However, the relationship trend between intolerance to
pragmatic violations and the reduction in the P3b effect elicited
by literal some suggests that the pragmatic mismatch was less easy
to suppress in order to treat some literally for some participants.
Alongside the discussion of our results, we have considered
circumstantial evidence from other studies. Further investigation
is required to characterize the nature of mismatch resolution
processes we have hypothesized. Nevertheless, further research in
experimental pragmatics should not only consider the principled
difficulty of deriving scalar inferences but also that of dealing with
mismatches in general (see also Shetreet et al., 2014).
4.3. Evaluating Intolerance to Pragmatic
Violations Based on Sentence Verification
In the questionnaire, we used under-informative statements
such as:
(7) Some infants are young.
in order to evaluate individual intolerance to pragmatic
violations.
Although adults tend to be more intolerant to pragmatic
violations generally, we found a relative proportion of
participants who always, or almost always, strongly agreed
with the under-informative statements (Pragmatism score of 0
or 1, 30 participants out of 52). This could be due to the fact
that some of the statements we used were similar to (7), which is
under-informative because all infants, by definition, are young,
but others were like:
(8) Some hammers have a handle.
for which counter-examples or exceptions to the alternative
all-statement can more easily be found (e.g., old or broken
hammers could lack a handle, see also Guasti et al., 2005, pp.
690–691). In such cases, it can be argued that an informative
alternative statement would be Most hammers have a handle
rather than All hammers have a handle, which may render (8)
more acceptable than (7). Indeed, when Feeney et al. (2004,
experiment 3) used only statements of the sort of (8), half of
their adult participants gave literal responses only. Guasti et al.
(2005, pp. 690–691) argue that such statements can encourage
participants to attempt figuring out exceptions to universal
statements (e.g., All hammers have a handle) in order to make
the under-informative statements more sensible and informative.
However, Antoniou and Katsos (2011, experiment 2) who
controlled the context provided to their participants (who judged,
e.g., “There are suns on some of the cards” whilst looking at
cards all featuring a sun) found that approximately half of the
participants always gave literal responses. Therefore, the fact
that the context of evaluation was not controlled in the case
of under-informative statements such as (8) probably fails to
explain alone why adults are sometimes unexpectedly tolerant
to pragmatic violations. Yet participants could have resorted to
another strategy leading to the observed preponderance of literal
responses and a lack of variation in response types despite our
use of a four-level rating scale rather than a binary forced-choice
(true/false): the formal settings of the experiment might have
invited participants to consider the some-statements as a test
of logic.
In sum, even when controlling context of evaluation, and
despite offering multiple possible choices rather than binary
choices, participants appear to develop strategies idiosyncratic
to the testing context. In any case, some participants seem
to have opted for the easy task (dealing with true/matching
rather than false/mismatching statements, see Section 4.1 and
4.2). If we are on the right track with this interpretation
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of the “agree”/“true”/logical/literal response mode in sentence
verification tasks, it is in fact very pragmatic in a broad sense (for
computational and human cognition saving principles, see e.g.,
Montague, 2007).
4.4. Pragmatism and Systemizing
The score the participants obtained in the Systemizing Quotient-
Revised questionnaire was the only significant parameter in
the analysis of Pragmatism score. We discuss here some
implications of this novel finding although the relationship
between personality and cognitive traits and SI derivation
requires further investigation.
Apart from “default models,” pragmatic theories assume that
SI derivation requires some sort of mind-reading since the
hearer has to reason about speaker’s knowledge and what she
did not say (see Section 1). It could be considered surprising
that we found no relationship between Empathy Quotient or
Interpersonal Reactivity Index perspective-taking sub-scale and
Pragmatism score. However, no information about the person
producing the statements or other contextual information was
provided to the participants and it was thus impossible to
work out the producer’s intentions or the context in which the
statements were made. As regards Autism-Spectrum Quotient
communication sub-scale and Pragmatism score, the tentative
prediction made by Nieuwland et al. (2010, p. 343): “one possible
prediction is that high AQ-Comm people are also more likely
to respond ‘true’ to under-informative statements in a sentence-
verification paradigm” was not supported (see also e.g., Heyman
and Schaeken, 2015).
Our data suggest that there may be a relationship between
systemizing and intolerance to pragmatic violations, such that
Pragmatism score would tend to increase with SQ-R score. This
could be seen as an inconsistent result if SQ-R is considered a
proxy for logical reasoning. But this could in fact be expected if
systemizing is taken to index participants’ ability to work out the
make up of the experiment and thus their ability to distinguish
those statements that are under-informative [e.g., (7) or (8) ]
from others that are not, e.g.,:
(9) Some birds live in cages.
However, the experimental context alone probably fails to
account for our results because the questionnaire featured only
5 true and felicitous some-statements, and because some- and
all-statements were intermixed with 213 other statements from
the AQ, EQ, SQ-R, and IRI. Another explanation could be that
the better the participants at systemizing, the more salient the
lexical scale 〈all, some〉 and thus the easier the first step of SI
derivation. As suggested by van Tiel et al. (2016, pp. 32–33),
hearers might rely on statistical regularities such as: if the speaker
uses “some. . . ,” then she means “not all. . . ,” in order to derive
SIs. According to Baron-Cohen (2008, p. 66), systemizing leads
to identification of rules of the following form: “If X (operation)
occurs, A (input) changes to B,” and thus a strong sensitivity
to patterns. In other words, it is possible that the better the
participants at systemizing, the greater the likelihood of some
meaning not all.
The trend for a positive relationship between intolerance to
pragmatic violation and systemizing skills also makes sense in
light of the literature on high-functioning autism and Asperger’s
syndrome. Individuals with such cognitive style are assumed
to experience difficulties with pragmatics, however they are as
intolerant to pragmatic violations as controls (whether they
are adults, Pijnacker et al., 2009; or children, Chevallier et al.,
2010). Since they are usually very good at systemizing whilst
scoring low on EQ and high on AQ (see e.g., Wheelwright
et al., 2006), systemizing skills must help in sentence verification
tasks. If we are on the right track with our interpretation
of the “agree”/“true”/logical/literal response mode in sentence
verification tasks as finally the pragmatic one (in a broad sense:
save energy whenever possible), it is no longer expected from
individuals with high-functioning autism or Asperger’s syndrome
to particularly opt for this response mode. Furthermore, since
systemizing is linked with attention to detail and leads to the
seeking of exact truth (Baron-Cohen, 2008, 2011), it makes sense
that participants with high systemizing skills tend to agree less
with statements that do not describe reality with high accuracy,
that are not optimal.
5. CONCLUSION
Using a novel oddball paradigm with single words and
recording hit rates, reaction times and brain activity whilst
controlling for task demands, and collecting a measure of inter-
individual variation, we failed to replicate a straightforward
literal interpretation facilitation effect. Crucially, we provided
some evidence to explain why this effect may not be entirely
construed as some models of experimental pragmatics have
it. We suggest that scalar inference derivation also involves
generic, possibly unconscious, albeit cognitively costly and
context-driven, procedures for mismatch processing. We argue
that the true “pragmatic,” that is efficient, response to under-
informative some-statements in sentence verification tasks is not
“false”/“disagree”/rejection but “true”/“agree”/acceptance: it saves
brain energy when not much is at stake.
Overall, we take the view that our data reveal a little more how
flexible and adaptive the human cognitive system is.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE A1 | All- and some-statements used in the questionnaire (see Section 2.2.1).
Condition Statement
List 1 List 2
True universals All bikes have wheels All airplanes have wings
All books have pages All cars have engines
All elephants have trunks All cats have ears
All hammers have a handle All circles are round
All infants are young All fish can swim
All refrigerators have doors All freezers are cold
All robins have wings All gangs have members
All rock bands have musicians All giraffes have long necks
All sentences have words All people have lungs
All zebras have stripes All televisions have screens
False universals All animals are black All children are blonde
All birds live in cages All dresses have pockets
All books have color pictures All drinks are made from chocolate
All clothes have zippers All flowers are yellow
All dogs have spots All tools are made of wood
All birds have telephones All birds have telephones
All chairs tell the time All chairs tell the time
All couches have windows All couches have windows
All crayons have noses All crayons have noses
All garages sing All garages sing
True existentials Some children are blonde Some books have color pictures
Some dresses have pockets Some clothes have zippers
Some drinks are made from chocolate Some dogs have spots
Some flowers are yellow Some animals are black
Some tools are made of wood Some birds live in cages
False existentials Some books are good to eat Some books are good to eat
Some children are made of feathers Some children are made of feathers
Some fruits have computers Some fruits have computers
Some mammals are made of leaves Some mammals are made of leaves
Some stores are made of bubbles Some stores are made of bubbles
Test existentials Some airplanes have wings Some bikes have wheels
Some cars have engines Some books have pages
Some cats have ears Some elephants have trunks
Some circles are round Some hammers have a handle
Some fish can swim Some infants are young
Some freezers are cold Some refrigerators have doors
Some gangs have members Some robins have wings
Some giraffes have long necks Some rock bands have musicians
Some people have lungs Some sentences have words
Some televisions have screens Some zebras have stripes
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APPENDIX B
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FIGURE A1 | Material used in the ERP experiment (see Section 2.2.2).
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FIGURE A2 | Distribution of score for each of the measures derived from the questionnaire (see Sections 2.2.1 and 3.4). (A) Pragmatism score
(Mean = 5.48, Median = 1, SD = 8.35, Skewness = 1.46.). (B) SQ-R score (Mean = 61.58, Median = 61.5, SD = 19.63, Skewness = 0). (C) EQ score (Mean =
43.6, Median = 44.5, SD = 10.32, Skewness = −0.06). (D) IRI-Perspective Taking score (Mean = 14.96, Median = 15, SD = 2.87, Skewness = 0.14). (E)
AQ-Communication score (Mean = 2.63, Median = 2, SD = 1.95, Skewness = 0.56).
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TABLE A2 | Model comparison (see Section 3.4).
Null model Initial model Final model
Intercept 0.00417 (0.00062)*** 0.00520 (0.00434) 0.00863 (0.00224)***
SQ-R −0.00007 (0.00003)* −0.00007 (0.00003)*
EQ −0.00001 (0.00007)
IRI-PT 0.00026 (0.00023)
AQ-Comm 0.00006 (0.00035)
AIC 337.41 336.43 332.64
BIC 341.31 348.13 338.49
Log Likelihood −166.70 −162.21 −163.32
Num. obs. 52 52 52
Estimates and standard errors (in brackets). ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
An inverse Gaussian distribution was used as family, negative estimates should be read
as positive estimates, and positive estimates as negative ones. Table realized using the R
package texreg (Leifeld, 2013).
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